How Ukraine Was Led Down the Primrose Path of War
It is commonly believed that the war in Ukraine should only be blamed on Russia, and that the Western world has no other option than to wage war. But diplomacy was always an option. It still may be.
Fighting the ultimate evil (again)
Every time we find ourselves in a conflict, we are always told that we are facing is the new Hitler. We are told that we need to act like Winston Churchill would, and face the enemy head on, while denigrating those calling for diplomacy as cowardly embodiments of Neville Chamberlain, who want to appease the enemy rather than face it in battle. It’s apparently a quite effective mythology, as it is applied continuously. You would think that after the title of “The New Hitler” had been given a dozen times, it would lose its gravitas, but we seem to have too short historical memories for it to lose its effect.
This narrative is extremely effective, because it frames the conflict as being black and white, making the only apparent moral action to support the war that the governments wants to wage. It thus induces a tribalist (us versus them) worldview. When people think this way, any dissent is readily branded as cowardice or treason, or as mentioned before, acting like Chamberlain.
In 2003, when the US invaded Iraq, President George Bush stated in his State of the Unions speech, that “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”; a statement, which although made in the context of stating that nations supporting terrorists would be considered enemies of the US, demonstrated a much more general assertion of how the war should be regarded. Opponents of the war where often branded as traitors, terrorist-sympathisers, or apologists of the Iraqi regime, even though they were generally pointing out the obvious flaws in the reasoning behind the invasion.
Russia sets out to conquer all of Europe?
Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion, the dominant narrative has been that Russia is set on conquering Ukraine as part of am imperialist project, and that it is set on taking over all of Europe. Putin was quickly branded as a the new Hitler, and those seeking to challenge this narrative and call for diplomacy were aggressively branded as Chamberlain-like appeasers, whose reticence to support the war would enable Russia to take over all of Europe. Western leaders quickly took the opportunity to roleplay their best impressions of Churchill, and called for aggressive confrontation with Russia, with little consideration of the fact that they were radically escalating tensions with a nuclear-armed nation.
As this narrative became dominant, diplomacy was thrown out the window, and an unnecessary war was enabled, which has led to more than ten-thousand dead civilians and likely hundreds of thousands of dead soldiers.
As a disclaimer before I explain why this narrative is not in fact an accurate reflection of reality, it is important to note that just because I argue that it is inaccurate to compare Putin to Hitler, doesn’t mean that there isn’t many ways in which he can and should be criticised. It also doesn’t mean that I’m making a final judgement on whether or not Russia’s invasion was morally justified. Instead, my intention is to demonstrate, that diplomacy has in fact been a viable option this entire time, and furthermore, that the primary thing that has prevented it, has been the dominance of this black and white narrative, especially in the attitudes of Western leaders.
Getting to the root-cause of the war
Around the time of the fall of the Soviet Union, in early 1990, negotiations were taking place between Soviet leadership and US, regarding the unification of East- and West-Germany, along with the unified Germany joining NATO. The primary concern of the Soviet leadership, was the expansion of NATO towards it territories, which it for obvious reasons considered a potential existential threat. After all, it had been in a cold war with NATO for around 4 decades, and was at this time in a weakened state compared to NATO and the US. Thus, at the negotiations, the main concern of the Soviet leadership, was ensuring its strategic security, and not only was this was made entirely clear during the negotiations, it was also explicitly recognised by US and German diplomats and leaders.
As Joshua Shifrinson, Professor of international relations, mentions in his article “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to Limit NATO Expansion”, NATO never made a codified (written) agreement, which explicitly stated, that NATO would not expand east, -an argument often used to assert the claim, that the US had in fact made no guarantees to the Soviet Union, and by extension thereof, Russia. Yet, as Shifrinson demonstrates, there is ample evidence, that a guarantee of non-expansion of NATO, was fundamental to the achievement of the final settlement.
Famously, then US Secretary of State James Baker, who was a primary negotiator, stated to the then Soviet Foreign Minister that:
“there will be no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction or NATO’s forces one inch to the East”
As Shifrinson further demonstrates, this assurance was repeated in several ways to the Soviets, by the US and German negotiators during the negotiations, and it was this assurance, which enabled the conclusion of the settlement.
As Shifrinson argues, it was made clear to the Soviets, that NATO non-expansion was assured, and thus the final settlement could focus on the future security-cooperation in Europe:
“The United States did not formally commit to forgo NATO expansion, but its efforts throughout 1990 to engage the Soviet Union implied the existence of a non-expansion deal; as Gorbachev subsequently noted, assurances against NATO expansion were part of the “spirit” of the 1990 debates.
Ultimately, if Europe was to be linked by a new set of security institutions while NATO was militarily constrained and had an increasingly political focus, then formal non-expansion guarantees were superfluous. The structure of the deal would suffice: promises of new institutions, a transformed NATO, and an alliance with a circumscribed role in the former GDR suggested that NATO expansion was off the table.”
In spite of these assurances, NATO did expand dramatically to the east. Each round of expansion, was met with emphatic protest by Russian leaders, yet as Russia was in a very weak state in this period, its protests were ignored and dismissed by Western leaders.
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As mentioned earlier, the main argument used by proponents of NATO expansion, is that since no agreement was made explicitly limiting NATO, and that NATO is therefore free to expand as it pleases. This argument is not only dubious from a legal standpoint, but truly disastrous from the perspective of international cooperation.
First of all it is worth remarking, that while many argue that only written agreements hold any weight, unwritten assurances are fundamental to diplomacy, and used readily in international relationships.
As Shifrinson puts it:
“as Secretary of State John Kerry acknowledged, even non-”legally binding” agreements constitute a “necessary tool” of foreign policy. Put simply, explicit and codified arrangements are neither necessary nor sufficient for actors to strike deals and receive political assurances.”
The resolution of the Cuban missile-crisis of 1962, is an example of a conflict resolved through informal agreement.
Furthermore, the non-expansion assurances were not only fundamental to the final settlement, but also led to the very concessions from the Soviet Union, which the US was aiming for, which was the reunification of Germany and it joining NATO. This constituted a significant concession on the side of the Soviet leadership, as Germany had nearly destroyed Russia twice in the two world wars, and was now being allowed to not only re-unify, but also join a hostile military alliance. The idea that this concession would be made without adequate security-assurances is hard to imagine.
Yet, more importantly, the attitude of being willing to dismiss Russian security concerns, based on the claim that no legal obligation exists to limit NATO expansion, constitutes a disastrously irresponsible approach to international relations. As is clear from both internal communications between US diplomats and leaders, during and after the 1990 negotiations, along with public statements by heads of states in Europe, it was abundantly clear to Western leadership, that non-expansion of NATO, was a critical concern and vital strategic interest of Russia.
Joe Biden (current US President) explicitly acknowledged this in 1997, when commenting on the expansion of NATO:
“I think the one place where the greatest consternation would be caused in the short term, for admission – having nothing to do with the merit and preparedness of the countries coming in – would be to admit the Baltic states now, in terms of NATO-Russian, US-Russian relations”
“And if there was ever anything that was going to tip the balance, were it to be tipped, in terms of a vigorous and hostile reaction, I don’t mean military, in Russia, it would be that”
A year later, in 1998, George Kennan, one of the primary US diplomats responsible for advocating the US’ “containment”-policy towards the Soviet Union, stated in no uncertain terms, that NATO expansion was a grave mistake:
“I think it is the beginning of a new cold war. I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will affect their policies. I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anybody else. This expansion would make the Founding Fathers of this country turn over in their graves.”
In 2008, William Burns (then Ambassador to Russia and current Director of the CIA), warned in a cable, which was revealed by WikiLeaks, that NATO inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia, was a violation of a clear red line:
“Ukraine and Georgia's NATO aspirations not only touch a raw nerve in Russia, they engender serious concerns about the consequences for stability in the region. Not only does Russia perceive encirclement, and efforts to undermine Russia's influence in the region, but it also fears unpredictable and uncontrolled consequences which would seriously affect Russian security interests. Experts tell us that Russia is particularly worried that the strong divisions in Ukraine over NATO membership, with much of the ethnic-Russian community against membership, could lead to a major split, involving violence or at worst, civil war. In that eventuality, Russia would have to decide whether to intervene; a decision Russia does not want to have to face.”
At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, where NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO, (an announcement which was vehemently discouraged by Russia) Angela Merkel was one of the main parties to block Ukraine and Georgias admission to NATO, and her explanation of why she did, demonstrates a clear understanding of the issue at hand:
“I was very sure … that Putin is not going to just let that happen. From his perspective, that would be a declaration of war."
In 2016, William Perry, who was Secretary of Defence during the Clinton-administration, made his objections to NATO expansion clear:
“Our first action that really set us off in a bad direction was when NATO started to expand, bringing in eastern European nations, some of them bordering Russia. At that time, we were working closely with Russia and they were beginning to get used to the idea that NATO could be a friend rather than an enemy ... but they were very uncomfortable about having NATO right up on their border and they made a strong appeal for us not to go ahead with that.”
The list of diplomats, heads of states, academics, historians and journalists goes far beyond the above examples (click here for more examples), yet what is clear, is that the US government, has been well aware of how NATO expansion has been considered an existential threat by Russia, and has expanded in spite thereof.
A recent example of Western leadership acknowledging that this war is fundamentally caused by NATO expansion, is the speech of none other than the current NATO-Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, who stated in a press conference in november 2023, that:
“We have to remember that one of the reasons why President Putin went to war against Ukraine was that he didn't want Ukraine to join the Alliance. And he wanted more than that. He actually wanted NATO to guarantee no further NATO enlargement. He wanted NATO to remove all its forces from the eastern part of the Alliance.”
Thus, non-expansion wasn’t some obscure term, which was briefly discussed at the negotiations of 1990, only to be discarded later; it was and remains a central security concern for Russia, which Western leaders have not only been entirely aware of, but had, as mentioned earlier, also assured Russia would be respected in 1991. Therefore, even if no legal obligation existed to limit NATO expansion, it has clearly been a disastrous decision to do so.
Legal or not, every nation has security concerns
There are critics who nonetheless make the point that, regardless of what Russia’s concerns may be, the fact that no written treaty has been signed between the parties, gives the US and NATO free rein to expand as it pleases. Yet, even if it is conceded that there is no explicit legal restrictions on NATO expansion, this in no way changes the underlying issue of Russia’s security concerns; NATO expansion has clearly been considered an existential threat by Russia, which the US and NATO leadership has been well aware of, and thus it should have guided NATO’s policy in a way that would avoid threatening Russia. The fact that it may have been legal for NATO to expand, doesn’t make it any less of a terrible decision. I argue that this would even be the case, if it’s conceded that not even verbal assurances were actually given.
The are also some who will claim, that this way of looking at the conflict is merely appeasement of Russia, which will enable it to continue it’s alleged imperial conquest, yet in reality it is simply a sober and pragmatic way of viewing international conflicts.
The earlier mentioned Cuban missile-crisis of 1962, makes for a prime example of how the US itself would not tolerate military expansion towards its borders. After NATO placed nuclear missiles in Turkey in the mid 1950’s, the Soviet Union responded by placing its own missiles in Cuba, leading to a crisis that nearly escalated to nuclear conflict. Should the US simply have accepted Soviet missiles in Cuba?; according to the worldview of those who dismiss then notion of security-assurances, the answer would have to be yes. Of course, everyone understood that it was an unacceptable situation, and thus the only acceptable outcome was an (nonverbal) agreement to deescalate, with each party removing its missiles from its opponents neighbouring territory. The world came very close to a nuclear war at this time.
The point is, that geo-strategic concerns exist regardless of the established legal framework, and the idea that a nation would not act when confronted with what it considers an existential threat is absurd. The US criticising Russia in this case is particularly hypocritical, as it itself upholds the so called “Monroe Doctrine”; an attitude towards international politics which essentially means that it won’t allow other great powers to interfere in the regions around it (essentially all of the Americas). Cuba is an independent country outside the US, yet when the Soviets were allowed by the Cuban government to place missiles there in the 1960’s, the US considered that an existential threat, and we almost had a nuclear war because of it.
-Would the US accept Mexico entering into a military alliance with Russia today?; probably not.
Another argument made by critics, is that the whole concern over NATO expansion is merely a Russian smoke-screen, behind which it hides it’s secret imperialistic intentions; that it’s invasion of Ukraine (and earlier intervention in Georgia) is proof that it wants to conquer all of Europe.
There are several problems with this argument. Firstly, no real evidence is actually presented by proponents of this argument, that these have been Russia’s intentions. Instead, the argument rests on the premise that Putin is inherently imperialistic; something that may well be true, but this isn’t in itself evidence that he’d attempt to conquer all of Europe. Something that would be hard to imagine, given that that would cause a third world war.
Secondly, arguing that the war in Georgia and Ukraine is proof that Russia seeks to conquer all of Europe, entirely ignores the obvious context of those wars. Russia stated clearly that Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO, would be crossing a red line. NATO chose to attempt to include these countries, crossing the red line and prompting a Russian response, and now this response is presented as evidence, that Russia was imperialist all along.
This isn’t to say that it’s impossible that Russia has imperialist ambitions, but instead that there doesn’t seem to be strong evidence for this being the case, and moreover that what is presented as evidence (the invasion of Ukraine), is much more likely a response to NATO expansion.
Diplomatic efforts were made - The US and UK tanked them
A further argument often made, is that Putin is a madman, and that diplomacy is simply not an option in this case, as has been argued repeatedly by officials such as US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken. Yet, looking at the history of the last decade, this doesn’t appear to be the case.
Ever since the US-aided coup (to some a revolution) of early 2014, during which the democratically elected President Yanukovych was overthrown, leading to a civil war between the government forces and the militias of the eastern regions of Donbas and Luhansk, Russia has been engaged with Ukraine in attempting to resolve the civil war, along with it’s own security concerns, through the so-called Minsk Accords. These negotiations ultimately failed to achieve peace, but have nonetheless demonstrated a willingness of Russia to engage in diplomatic solutions. On the contrary, Western leaders, such as Angela Merkel, have now stated that their part in the negotiation was merely to stall Russia.
Yet, more important have been Russia’s diplomatic efforts leading up to, and during the ongoing war in Ukraine.
In December 2021, Russia sent a draft proposal for a peace-treaty to the US, which dismissed it, thus missing a key opportunity to avoid war. NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated the following about this treaty, during the earlier mentioned press conference of November 2023:
“President Putin declared in the autumn of 2021, and actually sent a draft treaty that they wanted NATO to sign, to promise no more NATO enlargement. That was what he sent us. And was a pre-condition for not invading Ukraine. Of course we didn't sign that.
The opposite happened. He wanted us to sign that promise, never to enlarge NATO. He wanted us to remove our military infrastructure in all Allies that have joined NATO since 1997, meaning half of NATO, all the Central and Eastern Europe, we should remove NATO from that part of our Alliance, introducing some kind of B, or second class membership. We rejected that.
So, he went to war to prevent NATO, more NATO, close to his borders.”
After the war began on February 24th 2022, diplomatic conversation immediately began, which led to an opportunity for an agreement by April the same year. The talks were held in Istanbul, and besides the delegations of Ukraine and Russia, several high ranking officials attended, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennet.
Several of the officials present have confirmed not only that Russia was willing to accept the agreement, but also that it was Western leaders who intentionally sabotaged the agreement.
One of the diplomats sent by Kiev to the negotiations was the Ukranian diplomat Ambassador Oleksander Chalyi, who made some remarkable and revealing statements about the negotiations during a debate in late 2023. He stated that the Russian and Ukrainian delegation “were very close in the middle of April […] to finalise our war with some peaceful settlement” and that in his personal view “Putin […] very quickly understood he did mistake, and tried to do everything possible to conclude agreement with Ukraine”.
He further stated that Putin personally accepted the text of the Istanbul Communique, “which [was] totally far away from the initial proposal of Russia […], and that they managed to find “a very real compromise; so Putin really wanted to reach some peaceful settlement with Ukraine, it’s very important to remember”.
Furthermore, the head of the Ukrainian delegation, and Parliamentary leader of Zelensky’s political party, Davyd Arakhamia has stated in an interview, that the Russians “were prepared to end the war if we agreed to – as Finland once did – neutrality, and committed that we would not join NATO”, stating further, that this neutrality was in fact “the key point” of the negotiations. Arakhamia did contest the notion that the negotiations could lead to a settlement, but as journalist Aaron Maté argues, this appears to have been due primarily to the unwillingness of Western leaders to provide security guarantees for Ukraine, and instead urging it to keep fighting.
The earlier mentioned former Israeli Prime Minister, Naftali Bennet, has also stated that a deal was possible, before the US and UK sabotaged it. This claim has been backed up by a number of experts such as former Swiss intelligence officer and NATO adviser, Jacques Baud, Economist and public policy analyst, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, and University of Chicago Professor of political Science, John Mearsheimer, among many others.
Now this is not to say that it can be said for certain that these negotiations would have led to a peaceful settlement. Nor can I dismiss the possibility that Russia has merely sought to uphold a facade of willingness to engage in diplomacy to improve its public image. But based on the available evidence, it does seem like the Russian government has shown a real willingness to resolve the war diplomatically.
Even if the Istanbul-negotiations weren’t close to a positive outcome when they collapsed, it has been a catastrophic mistake to urge Ukraine towards war, rather than to do everything to enable a diplomatic solution.
A lost cause
For the first months of the war, Western leadership was able to claim that Ukraine was winning the war, as it had been able to hold off the Russian invasion seemingly with some success. And as pointed out by Aaron Maté, it seemed Russia once again signalled a willingness to negotiate:
“According to US officials interviewed by the New York Times, Putin “sent out feelers for a cease-fire deal... in the fall of 2022.” Following major Russian losses in Ukraine’s northeast regions of Kharkiv and Kherson, “Putin indicated that he was satisfied with Russia’s captured territory and ready for an armistice,” these officials said. The Russian president made another attempt at outreach this past September, signaling through intermediaries that “he is ready to make a deal.” According to former senior Russian officials and American counterparts who have communicated with Putin’s envoys, Putin “is open to a cease-fire that freezes the fighting along the current lines,” a stance that falls “far short” of US claims that he harbors “ambitions to dominate Ukraine.””
Around this time, then US Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, called for Ukraine to negotiate with Russia, based on the argument, that Ukraine had done as well as it could on the battlefield, and should use it’s relatively strong position for the purpose of negotiations:
“When there’s an opportunity to negotiate, when peace can be achieved, seize it”, Milley stated in a public speech.
The US and NATO leadership ignored this plea, and urged Ukraine onwards, while spending billions in military aid for the country. Instead of urging diplomacy, the US began promoting the narrative of the “counter-offensive” which was claimed to prove Ukraine’s ability to win the war. Coming as little surprise to anyone with an understanding of the facts on the ground, the counter-offensive earned Ukraine almost no victories at a great cost, and since then Ukraine’s strength has steadily declined, making it increasingly difficult for Western leadership to pretend that victory is an actual possibility.
Now, the reality of the situation in Ukraine is becoming increasingly undeniable, and even staunch advocates of the war, have a difficult time denying the evident fact, that Ukraine is in dire straits.
As the Ukrainian government struggles to recruit enough men for the war, a continuous flow of video footage can be found online, showing Ukrainian men (some of whom are hardly able for war) being dragged into vans of the street, and forced to be used as cannon-fodder in this war.
In his famous 2015 lecture, Professor John Mearsheimer, argued that the US was leading Ukraine down the “primrose path”, by seeking to include it into NATO.
Tragically, his prediction seems to have come true, and the only apparent hope for peace is for the West to engage diplomatically with Russia, so as to not only avoid further needless bloodshed, but also to avert the potential of a nuclear war.